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Abstract
This paper proposes a way of explaining the undeclared economy that represents participation in undeclared 
work as a violation of the social contract between the state and its citizens, and as arising when the informal 
institutions comprising the norms, values and beliefs of citizens (civic morality) do not align with the codified 
laws and regulations of a society’s formal institutions (state morality). Drawing upon evidence from 1,018 
face-to-face interviews conducted in Bulgaria during 2013, the finding is that the greater is the asymmetry 
between formal and informal institutions (i.e., citizens’ civic morality and state morality), the greater is the 
likelihood of participation in the undeclared economy, and vice versa. The outcome is that tackling the un-
declared economy requires a focus upon reducing this lack of alignment of formal and informal institutions. 
How this can be achieved in Bulgaria in particular and South-East Europe and beyond more generally, is then 
discussed. 
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1. InTRODuCTIOn
In recent years, a burgeoning literature has re-
vealed the size of the undeclared economy in South-
Eastern Europe and its crucial role in providing citi-
zens with a means of getting-by (Baric and Williams 
2013, Dzhekova and Williams 2014, Dzhekova et al. 
2014, Franic and Williams 2014, Gaspareniene et al. 
2014, Hudson et al., 2012, Remeikiene et al. 2014, 
Schneider 2013; Williams 2012). With around a quar-
ter of national income in South-East Europe not de-
clared to the authorities and a similar share of total 
employment in the undeclared economy (Schneider 
and Williams 2013), tackling participation in the 
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undeclared economy is not some relatively minor is-
sue of limited importance. This sphere not only leads 
to governments losing considerable public revenue 
that could otherwise pay for wider social cohesion 
and social protection, but also results in poorer quality 
working conditions and unfair competition for legiti-
mate businesses. Indeed, unless addressed, pressure 
occurs on legitimate businesses in South-East Europe 
to themselves flout the formal regulations, resulting in 
a vicious and ongoing levelling down of working con-
ditions (Andrews et al. 2011, ILO 2014). 
Participation in the undeclared economy in South-
East Europe and beyond has been so far explained 
largely in terms of country-level structural conditions 
such as the level of economic development and the 
lack of modern state bureaucracies, public sector cor-
ruption and high taxes, or inadequate levels of so-
cial protection and intervention in work and welfare 
by the state (see Williams 2013). These country-level 
structural explanations of the undeclared economy 
however, are unable to explain why some citizens in 
a country participate in the undeclared economy and 
others do not. That is to say, they fail to take agency 
into account in their explanations. 
The aim of this paper therefore, is to advance a way 
of explaining the undeclared economy in South-East 
Europe that takes agency into account. Drawing upon 
institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder 2008, Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004, North 1990), the undeclared econ-
omy is here explained as a violation of the social con-
tract between the state and its citizens, and as arising 
when there is a lack of alignment of the codified laws 
and regulations of a society’s formal institutions with 
the norms, beliefs and values of its citizens (i.e., infor-
mal institutions). The proposition is that the greater is 
this lack of alignment between the formal and infor-
mal institutions, the greater is the likelihood of partici-
pation in the undeclared economy, and vice versa. If 
valid, this has consequences for how the undeclared 
economy is tackled. Reducing this institutional asym-
metry necessitates a very different policy approach to 
the approach currently adopted in South-East Europe 
and beyond. 
To evaluate this way of explaining the undeclared 
economy, therefore, section 2 provides a brief review 
of the shortcomings of previous explanations of the 
undeclared economy and proposes an explanation 
grounded in institutional theory to overcome these 
shortcomings. To evaluate this institutional asymme-
try thesis, section 3 then introduces the methodology 
and data used, namely a stepwise Tobit regression 
analysis of the association between participation in 
the undeclared economy and the degree of institu-
tional asymmetry using data from 1,018 face-to-face 
interviews conducted in Bulgaria during 2013. Section 
4 then presents the findings followed in section 5 by a 
discussion of the theoretical and policy implications, 
and in section 6 some conclusions along with the limi-
tations of this study and future research required.
At the outset however, the undeclared economy 
needs to be defined. For Castells and Portes (1989: 
15), such endeavour is ‘a specific form of income gen-
erating production… unregulated by the institutions 
of society in a legal and social environment in which 
similar activities are regulated’. Although this defines 
the undeclared economy through the lens of both 
the formal (‘legal’) and informal (‘social’) institutions 
in a society, this definition fails to recognise firstly, 
that the undeclared economy, even if unregulated by 
formal institutions, is regulated by the rules of infor-
mal institutions and secondly, that such work can be 
considered ‘legitimate’ from the stance of informal in-
stitutions even if ‘illegal’ from the viewpoint of formal 
institutions (Siqueira et al. 2014, Webb et al. 2009). In 
consequence, and reflecting the consensus in the lit-
erature, we here define the undeclared economy as 
socially legitimate paid work that is legal in all respects 
other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, 
social security or labour law purposes (European 
Commission 2007, OECD 2012, Williams 2014a,b). If it 
is illegal in other respects and also socially illegitimate, 
it is not part of the undeclared economy but rather 
part of the criminal economy (e.g., forced labour) 
which is both illegal from the viewpoint of formal in-
stitutions and illegitimate from the viewpoint of infor-
mal institutions. 
2. Explaining the undeclared economy in South-
East Europe
Since the turn of the millennium, there has been 
growing recognition that the undeclared economy 
is a significant component of South-East European 
economies. As Schneider (2013) for example has es-
timated, the undeclared economy in 2013 was the 
equivalent of 31.2 per cent of GDP in Bulgaria, 28.4 
per cent in Croatia, 28.4 per cent in Romania, 26.5 per 
cent in Turkey, 25.2 per cent in Cyprus, 23.6 per cent 
in Greece and 23.1 per cent in Slovenia. Meanwhile, 
Williams (2014a) estimates that the share of employ-
ment which is in the undeclared economy in 2013 as 
22.7 per cent in Croatia, 19.6 per cent in Slovenia, 15.7 
per cent in Bulgaria, 15.0 per cent in Greece, 14.6 per 
cent in Romania and 6.3 per cent in Cyprus. 
Undeclared economies of this magnitude have 
significant implications for governments and socie-
ties. As Table 1 reveals, and based on 2009 figures, the 
average size of the undeclared economy in the five 
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South-East European countries analysed was 29.9 per 
cent of GDP and on average, 22.8 per cent of the total 
tax revenue was lost in these countries. This equates 
to 137 per cent of current health care spending. Put 
another way, spending on health care in these coun-
tries could more than double if those operating in the 
undeclared economy paid their taxes.
Examining the variations in the size of the unde-
clared economy across South-East Europe, and as 
shown above, Bulgaria is often identified as having 
one of the largest undeclared economies. Indeed, indi-
rect measurement methods using proxy indicators to 
measure its prevalence find the undeclared economy 
to be on average the equivalent of around one-third 
of total GDP (Bogdanov and Stanchev 2010, Elgin and 
Öztunali 2012, Ministry of Finance 2011, Nenovski and 
Hristov 2000, Schneider 2013). Direct surveys of the 
size of the undeclared economy in Bulgaria, mean-
while, find that on average some one-fifth of employ-
ment is in the undeclared economy (BICA 2012, CSD 
2011, 2013, Loukanova and Bezlov 2007, Peracchi et 
al 2007, Perotti and Sanchez Puerta 2009, Stanchev 
2005, Williams 2014a). 
There have also been studies of the character of 
the Bulgarian undeclared economy. Firstly, these re-
veal firm-level variations in the prevalence of the un-
declared economy with greater involvement amongst 
small and medium-sized businesses (BICA 2011a, CSD 
2011, 2012, Dzhekova and Williams 2014, European 
Commission 2007). Secondly, they reveal sectorial 
variations with the undeclared economy more preva-
lent in construction, retail, tourism, hotels and restau-
rants, real estate, garments, food processing and the 
agricultural sectors as well as some services. Overall, 
it is labour-intensive, low technology sectors identi-
fied to be the sectors with the highest prevalence 
of the undeclared economy (BICA 2011a, CSD 2011, 
2012, General Labour Inspectorate 2013). Thirdly, 
studies have been conducted of the nature of unde-
clared work, showing that most is wholly or partially 
undeclared waged employment (50 per cent of all 
undeclared work) and that under-reporting salaries is 
more common than working without a contract, with 
some one-fifth of the formally employed receiving an 
additional undeclared ‘envelope’ wage from their em-
ployer (Dzhekova and Williams 2014). Fourthly, the so-
cio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
of those operating in the undeclared economy have 
been analysed. This reveals that men are more likely to 
work undeclared than women, as are those aged 45-
54 years old, the unemployed and those from small/
middle-sized towns and rural areas (Dzhekova and 
Williams 2014). 
Despite these variations within Bulgaria across 
firm-types, sectors, population groups and places, ex-
planations for the undeclared economy have largely 
focused upon country-level variables. As Williams 
(2014a) summarises, three major competing theoreti-
cal explanations exist. Firstly, ‘modernisation’ theory 
explains the undeclared economy in terms of the lack 
of economic development and modernisation of state 
bureaucracies (Geertz 1969, ILO 2013, Lewis 1959), 
secondly, ‘neo-liberal’ theory explains the undeclared 
economy as resulting from high taxes and too much 
state interference in the workings of the free mar-
ket (De Soto 1989, 2001, Nwabuzor 2005) and third 
and finally, ‘political economy’ theory explains this 
sphere as resulting from inadequate state interven-
tion and a lack of safeguards for workers (Castells and 
Portes 1989, Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra 2014, ILO 2014, 
Meagher 2010, Slavnic 2010). The problem with all 
these theories however, is that they do not explain 
Table 1  Tax revenue lost as a result of the undeclared economy, five South-East European countries 
Country GDP 
2009
Size of un-
declared 
economy 
2009
Tax  
burden 
2009
Tax revenue 
lost as a result 
of undeclared 
economy
Gov’t spend-
ing as % of 
GDP
Tax lost 
as a % 
of gov’t 
spending
Health care 
spending 
as % of 
GDP
Tax lost 
as % of 
healthcare 
spending
Euro’m % % Euro’m % % % %
Bulgaria 36,000 35.3 28.9 3,673 37.3 27.4 7.4 137.9
Cyprus 17,000 28.0 35.1 1,671 42.6 23.1 6.0 163.8
Greece 230,000 27.5 30.3 19,165 46.8 17.8 7.4 112.6
Romania 122,000 32.6 27.0 10,738 37.6 23.4 5.4 163.0
Slovenia 36,000 26.2 37.6 3,546 44.3 22.2 9.1 108.3
Total or 
unweighted 
average
441,000 29.9 31.8 38,793 22.8 137.1
Source: derived from Murphy (2012)
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why some within a country participate in the unde-
clared economy and others do not. The reason this 
is important is because although earlier studies as-
sumed that participation in undeclared work was ne-
cessity-driven (Castells and Portes 1989, Gallin 2001), 
more recent studies reveal that for the majority, par-
ticipation in the undeclared economy is more a matter 
of choice, rather than due to a lack of choice (Maloney 
2004, Round et al. 2008, Williams et al 2013). 
Here therefore, a new way of explaining the unde-
clared economy which takes agency into account is 
proposed. To do this, we draw upon institutional the-
ory which views institutions as setting the rules of the 
game by prescribing the norms regarding the accept-
ability of activities (Baumol and Blinder 2008, Denzau 
and North 1994, Dolenec 2013, Gërxhani 2004a,b, 
Mathias et al. 2014, North 1990, Podrug 2011). All so-
cieties have codified laws and regulations (i.e., formal 
institutions) that set the legal rules of the game (pre-
scribing ‘state morality’). They also have informal in-
stitutions which are norms, values and beliefs of the 
citizens; the ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, 
that are created, communicated and enforced outside 
of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004: 727). These prescribe ‘civic morality’. 
When symmetry exists between the formal and in-
formal institutions, the undeclared economy will be 
largely absent since citizens will seek to adhere to the 
legal rules of the game. The only reason informality 
will take place is because citizens unintentionally do 
so, such as due to the rules being not simple enough 
to understand or to complex too fulfil. However, if 
there is asymmetry between a society’s formal institu-
tions and its informal institutions, such as due to a lack 
of trust in government, the undeclared economy will 
be larger. Indeed, this is widely recognised in Bulgaria. 
Surveys have repeatedly pointed to a lack of trust in 
government due to for example public sector corrup-
tion and an inefficient judiciary as key reasons for the 
existence of undeclared work (European Commission 
2012a, Goev 2009, CSD 2011). Indeed, the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
ranks Bulgaria 112 out of 148 countries in terms of 
the quality of its institutions in 2014, with particularly 
low scores given to public trust in politicians (1.9 out 
of 7), favouritism in decisions of government officials 
(2.1 out of 7) and judicial independence (2.3) (WEF 
2014). The result is that national surveys show that 
undeclared work, although illegal from the viewpoint 
of formal institutions, enjoys high levels of social le-
gitimacy in Bulgaria (BICA 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, CSD 
2011, 2013, Chavdarova 2013). Here, therefore, and 
to test this new institutional theory that views the 
undeclared economy as arising from the asymmetry 
between state morality and civic morality, the follow-
ing proposition can be evaluated: 
Institutional asymmetry thesis: the greater is the 
asymmetry between formal and informal institu-
tions, the greater is the propensity to participate in 
the undeclared economy.
3. DATA AnD METHODOlOGY
To evaluate this institutional asymmetry thesis, we 
here examine Bulgaria which as shown above has one 
of the largest undeclared economies in South-East 
Europe, and therefore should possess a high level of 
institutional asymmetry. This is here investigated by 
reporting data from special Eurobarometer survey no. 
402, which involved 1,018 face-to-face interviews con-
ducted in 2013. A multi-stage random (probability) 
sampling methodology was used to ensure that on 
the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, both 
the Bulgarian national level sample as well as each lev-
el of the sample, was representative in proportion to 
its population size. 
In the face-to-face interviews, participants were 
firstly asked questions regarding their attitudes re-
garding the acceptability of various types of unde-
clared work, followed by questions on whether they 
had purchased from the undeclared economy and 
finally, whether they had participated in the unde-
clared economy in the prior 12 months. Here, we fo-
cus upon firstly, their attitudes regarding the accept-
ability of working in the undeclared economy, which 
measures the degree of institutional asymmetry, and 
secondly, whether they had participated in the unde-
clared economy. 
To measure the level of institutional symmetry, 
participants were asked to rate the acceptability of 
five types of undeclared work using a 10-point Likert 
scale (1 equals absolutely unacceptable and 10 equals 
absolutely acceptable). These five types of undeclared 
work were: an individual is hired by a household for 
work and he/she does not declare the payment re-
ceived to the tax or social security authorities even 
though it should be declared; a firm is hired by a 
household for work and it does not declare the pay-
ment received to the tax or social security authorities; 
a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not 
declare its activities to the tax or social security au-
thorities; a firm hires an individual and all or a part of 
the wages paid to him/her are not officially declared; 
and someone evades taxes by not declaring or only 
partially declaring their income.
Previous studies examining the acceptability of the 
undeclared economy have tended to use a single-item 
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measurement by constructing an aggregate index 
from such questions (Daude, Gutiérrez and Melguizo 
2013, Frey and Torgler 2007, Ristovska, Mojsoska-
Blazevski and Nikolov 2012, Torgler 2004, Williams and 
Martinez 2014a,b). However, and as Table 2 reveals, al-
though an examination of the pairwise correlations in-
dicates substantial cohesion among the five observed 
variables, with a high Cronbach’s alpha value when all 
five variables are in the model (α=0.89), it also reveals 
that the first type of undeclared work (i.e., undeclared 
work by an individual for a private household) is not 
strongly correlated with the other four. There is an in-
crease in both inter-item correlation and Cronbach’s 
alpha when this first variable is excluded, which is not 
the case with the remaining four variables. Given the 
higher level of social legitimacy of undeclared work by 
individuals for households compared with other types 
of undeclared work in Bulgaria, this suggests that this 
type of undeclared work should be analysed separate-
ly from the other types of undeclared work. 
Given that this first type of undeclared work needs 
to be considered separately in the stepwise Tobit re-
gression analysis, Table 3 reports the results of an ex-
ploratory factor analysis on the remaining four types 
of undeclared work. This reveals high positive loads 
on all four variables, with loadings ranging between 
0.76 and 0.87. Since these loadings represent coef-
ficients of correlation between the latent construct 
and observed indicators, it is apparent that this single 
extracted factor has a substantially positive influence 
on attitudes towards undeclared work in general. If 
interpreted in terms of unique variances, which are 
given in the last column of Table 3, we can see that the 
underlying factor explains more than 75 per cent of 
the variability among respondents when it comes to 
their attitudes towards undeclared work by a firm for 
another firm and a firm for a private household, while 
in the case of two other noncompliant behaviours this 
effect is slightly weaker. The result is that Bulgarian 
citizens apply two different standards when making 
judgements about undeclared work. Bulgarians have 
a different more permissive attitude towards indi-
viduals carrying out undeclared work for households, 
while not differentiating between the other types of 
noncompliant undeclared behaviour (i.e. attitudes 
towards them are determined by one latent factor). 
Here, therefore, we differentiate between undeclared 
work by an individual for a private household and un-
declared work in general. 
To evaluate whether institutional asymmetry (as 
measured by the acceptability of non-compliance re-
garding these two types of undeclared work) is asso-
ciated with participation in the undeclared economy, 
we include the two following variables to measure 
this:
 – Participation in the undeclared economy - a dum-
my variable with recorded value 1 for persons who 
answered “yes” to the question, “Have you yourself 
carried out any undeclared paid activities in the last 
12 months?” and with recorded value 0 otherwise.
Table 2 Inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha
  Item-rest 
correlation
Average inter-item  
correlation when  
the variable is excluded
Cronbach’s alpha 
when variable is 
excluded
Undeclared work by individual for private household 0.57 0.70 0.90
Undeclared work by firm for private household 0.80 0.58 0.85
Undeclared work by firm for firm 0.77 0.60 0.85
Firm hires a worker on undeclared basis 0.75 0.61 0.86
Someone partially or completely conceals their income 0.76 0.60 0.86
Test scale 0.62 0.89
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Special Eurobarometer 402/Wave EB79.2
Table 3  Exploratory factor analysis - factor loadings and uniqueness
  Factor loadings Uniqueness
Undeclared work by firm for private household 0.87 0.24
Undeclared work by firm for firm 0.88 0.23
Firm hires a worker on undeclared basis 0.79 0.37
Someone partially or completely conceals their income 0.76 0.43
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the Special Eurobarometer 402/Wave EB79.2
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 – Purchasing goods and services in the undeclared 
economy – a dummy variable denoting whether a 
respondent had purchased goods and/or services 
from the undeclared market during 12 months pre-
ceding the survey: 0-no, 1-yes.
Drawing upon past studies that measure attitudes 
towards undeclared work conducted in other coun-
tries, which reveal how the acceptability of participa-
tion in undeclared work varies by gender, age, mari-
tal status, occupation, social class, income level and 
area (Alm and Torgler 2006, Cannari and D’Alessio 
200,7 Daude and Melguizo 2010, Daude et al. 2013, 
Kastlunger et al, 2013, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 
2010, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 2009, Williams 
and Martinez 2014a,b), the explanatory variables here 
selected for investigation are: 
 – Gender – dummy variable for gender: 0-men, 
1-women.
 – Age – respondent’s age, six categories: 15-24, 25-
34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65 or more.
 – Marital status – a categorical variable describing re-
spondent’s marital status: 1-married, 2-cohabiting, 
3-single, 4-separated/divorced, 5-widowed.
 – Occupation – a categorical variable denoting cur-
rent job status of a respondent: 1-self-employed, 
2-managers, 3-other white collars, 4-manual work-
ers, 5-house persons, 6-unemployed, 7-pensioners, 
8-students.
 – Social class – a categorical variable for respondent’s 
position in society (self-assessment): 1-working 
class, 2-middle class, 3-higher class.
 – Financial problems – a categorical variable measur-
ing how often a respondent have problems in pay-
ing their bills: 1-most of the time, 2-from time to 
time, 3-almost never/never.
 – Community size – a categorical variable describing 
the size of the area where a respondent lives: 1-rural 
area or village, 2-small/middle town, 3-large town.
 – Bulgarian region – a categorical variable indicat-
ing a region of residence: 1- Northwest, 2- North 
Central, 3- Northeast, 4- Southeast, 5- Southwest, 
6- South Central 
To analyse the results, the two outcome vari-
ables from the exploratory factor analysis (i.e., the 
acceptability of an individual working undeclared 
for a household and the acceptability of general un-
declared work) are used as dependent variables in a 
regression model with a range of above described 
socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial ex-
planatory variables in order to test firstly, the institu-
tional asymmetry hypothesis and secondly, to reveal 
the socio-demographic, socio-economic and spatial 
variables strongly associated with lower adherence 
to the formal institutions, in order to display potential 
population groups where there is high institutional 
asymmetry. To do this, we use Tobit modelling, which 
accounts for the fact that the distribution of attitudes 
is truncated normal (Tobin 1958). In addition, given 
the low ratio of non-corner observations (i.e. individu-
als who did not express a ‘null-tolerance’ attitude) to 
the independent variables, stepwise approach is used 
as the most convenient method for finding significant 
covariates.
4. FInDInGS
The acceptability of participating in the undeclared 
economy across all five forms of undeclared work in 
Bulgaria is 2.46 (where 1 is totally unacceptable and 
10 totally acceptable). This display that the formal and 
informal institutions are therefore not wholly aligned 
(i.e., the institutional asymmetry index is not 1.00). 
Nevertheless, and as identified above, the social ac-
ceptability of participation in the undeclared econo-
my varies according to the type of undeclared work 
being considered. As Figure 1 displays, the Bulgarian 
population deem it more acceptable for an individual 
to undertake undeclared work for a household than 
to undertake other types of undeclared work. Indeed, 
the mean score for the acceptability of an individual 
engaging in undeclared work for a household is 3.71, 
whilst the for a firm hiring an undeclared worker this 
is 2.31, 2.41 for someone partially or completely con-
cealing their income, 2.35 for a firm doing undeclared 
work for a household, and even lower (2.12) for firms 
doing undeclared work for another firm (i.e., the low-
er the score, the more unacceptable is the activity). 
Indeed, this differentiation in the acceptability of an 
individual participating in the undeclared economy 
for a private household, compared with other forms 
of undeclared work, is replicated across not only the 
EU15 but also the new member states of the European 
Union, suggesting that the distinction of this type 
of undeclared work from other types of undeclared 
work can be more widely applied. It is also noticeable 
that the level of social legitimacy of undeclared work 
is higher in Bulgaria than in the older member states 
of the European Union, but lower than in other new 
member states. 
To see further the importance of differentiating 
individuals conducing undeclared work from private 
households from other types of undeclared work, 
Figure 2 reports the share of respondents reporting 
that these practices are highly acceptable (on the 
scale 1-10, where 1 is highly unacceptable and 10 is 
highly acceptable, we take only those respondents 
who answered 8-10). This reveals that one in eight 
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Figure 1  Acceptability of different types of undeclared work, a comparison of average scores for Bulgaria, EU15 and new 
member states
Note: 
NMS – Croatia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia 
EU15 – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the Special Eurobarometer 402/Wave EB79.2
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Figure 2  Share of respondents deeming undeclared work highly acceptable (8-10 where 1= totally unacceptable and 10 = 
totally acceptable) in Bulgaria and other EU regions
Source:  Special Eurobarometer 402 on Undeclared Work in the European Union, 2014
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respondents think it is highly acceptable for an indi-
vidual to undertake undeclared work for another pri-
vate household but this is much lower for other types 
of undeclared work. This also reveals similar trends in 
other EU regions. 
Is it the case therefore, that there is a relationship 
between the level of institutional asymmetry and 
participation in the undeclared economy? To evalu-
ate this, Table 4 reports the results of a stepwise Tobit 
regression analysis for the two dependent variables, 
Table 4  Tolerance of undeclared work conducted by individuals and companies, socio-economic and spatial determinants, 
Stepwise Tobit regression, marginal effects 
Variables Undeclared work by an individual for 
a private household
Undeclared work 
in general
Working undeclared 1.492*** (0.306) 0.971*** (0.281)
Purchasing undeclared goods and services 1.473*** (0.458) 0.756*** (0.184)
Female - -
Age (RC: over 65)
15-24 0.291 (0.473) 0.474 (0.282)
25-34 1.076** (0.418) 0.651* (0.269)
35-44 0.929* (0.371) 0.650** (0.230)
45-54 0.396 (0.383) 0.485*(0.237)
55-64 0.420 (0.396) 0.130 (0.240)
Marital status (RC: married)
Cohabiting - -
Single - -
Separated/divorced - -
Widowed - -
Occupation (RC: Retired)
Self-employed - -
Managers - -
Other white collars - -
Manual workers - -
House persons - -
Unemployed - -
Students - -
Social class (RC: Working class) 
Middle class - -0.351* (0.142)
Higher class - 0.635 (0.471)
Financial problems (RC: almost never/never) 
Most of the time - 0.548** (0.208)
From time to time - 0.206 (0.162)
Community size (RC: Rural area or village) 
Small/middle town - -
Large town - -
Region (RC: Southwest)
Northwest - -0.499* (0.210)
North Central - 0.053 (0.231)
Northeast - -0.340 (0.253)
Southeast - -0.396 (0.230)
South Central - -0.313 (0.213)
Sigma 3.829 2.390
Log likelihood -1528.195 - 1245.535
LR 83.44 69.30 
Prob > LR 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.033
Censored observations 266 320
Uncensored observations 496 462
Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, (standard errors in parentheses)
Notes:  1) Both dependent variables are measured on the scale from 1 to 10 (with value 1 indicating completely unaccepta-
ble and 10 absolutely acceptable). Therefore, positive values of coefficients indicate greater tolerance
2) Models are based on forward stepwise selection method. Missing coefficients (-) indicate that no significant variation is 
found across a covariate
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on the Special Eurobarometer 402/Wave EB79.2
Explaining the undeclared economy in Bulgaria: an institutional asymmetry perspective
41South East European Journal of Economics and Business,  Volume 9 (2) 2014
namely the acceptability of individuals participating 
in undeclared work for private households and the ac-
ceptability of undeclared work in general. The first row 
in Table 4 displays that adherence to the formal rules 
remains strongly associated with participation in un-
declared work across both dependent variables, even 
when controlling for other socio-demographic, socio-
economic and spatial characteristics. Since is it rea-
sonable to assume reverse causality (i.e. that lower tax 
morale implies a higher propensity for participation in 
undeclared economy), this indicates a risk of a vicious 
circle in which widespread undeclared practices dete-
riorate tax morale, which in turn additionally increases 
noncompliance. The institutional asymmetry thesis is 
therefore positively confirmed. The greater is the non-
alignment of informal institutions with formal institu-
tions, the higher is participation in undeclared work. 
This stepwise Tobit regression analysis also iden-
tifies the socio-demographic, socio-economic and 
spatial groups that are significantly more likely to not 
adhere to the formal rules when other characteristics 
are taken into account and held constant. The findings 
show that younger people in Bulgaria tend to tolerate 
undeclared work conducted by individuals for private 
households to a greater extent than older members 
of society. No significant variations are found across 
other dimensions such as gender, marital status, so-
cial class, occupation, financial problems being faced, 
community size and region. Turning to undeclared 
work more generally however, not only do middle-
aged people tolerate such work to a greater extent 
than the retired, but so too do the working class more 
than the middle class, and those with financial prob-
lems in paying the household bills, whilst those in the 
Northwest are less accepting of undeclared work than 
those in the Southwest. 
5. DISCuSSIOn
This article has evaluated the view that undeclared 
work is a violation of the social contract between the 
state and its citizens, and arises when the norms, val-
ues and beliefs of citizens (civic morality) do not align 
with the codified laws and regulations of a society’s 
formal institutions (state morality). To evaluate this, 
data from a survey of Bulgaria in 2013 has been used. 
This positively confirms the thesis; the greater is the 
asymmetry between formal and informal institutions, 
the greater is the likelihood of participation in the 
undeclared economy, and vice versa. This is strongly 
significant when holding constant other socio-demo-
graphic, socio-economic and spatial variables. This 
Bulgarian survey thus confirms that the undeclared 
economy arises when there is a lack of adherence to 
the formal rules. 
This has direct implications for how the undeclared 
economy is tackled. According to institutional theory, 
institutional asymmetry can be tackled using either 
disincentives (sticks) to dissuade citizens from engag-
ing in socially legitimate but illegal activities, or incen-
tives (carrots) to facilitate participation in legal activi-
ties (Matthias et al. 2014, North 1990). Conventionally, 
the Bulgarian government when tackling the unde-
clared economy, mirroring other South-East European 
governments, has used disincentives. They have 
sought to make the cost of being caught and pun-
ished greater than the pay-off from participating in 
the undeclared economy (Allingham and Sandmo 
1972, Dekker et al. 2010). Firstly, penalties and sanc-
tions have been increased and/or secondly, the like-
lihood of detection improved such as by increasing 
workplace inspections and by improving data sharing 
and matching to identify individuals engaged in unde-
clared employment (e.g., CSD 2009b, 2011, Dzhekova 
et al. 2014). In the period 2005 to 2009 for example, 
a review of measures to combat undeclared work in 
Bulgaria reveals that of the 222 measures, the major-
ity were focused on deterrence, using stricter require-
ments, tougher sanctions and improved detection 
(CSD 2009b). Indeed, amendments to the Labour Code 
enacted in 2006 and 2008 merely extended the pow-
ers of control and introduced harsher penalties and 
fines (Loukanova and Bezlov 2007, Daskalova 2013a). 
The problem with using this disincentives approach, 
however, is that tougher sanctions and improving 
detection decreases voluntary compliance because 
it undermines respect for the fairness of the system 
and leads to greater rather than less undeclared work 
(Chang and Lai 2004, Murphy 2005, Murphy and Harris 
2007). 
If participation in the undeclared economy is to be 
tackled therefore, a rather different policy approach 
will be required. Two options exist. Firstly, incentives 
to behave legitimately can be used, such as direct and 
indirect tax incentives to either suppliers or consum-
ers of undeclared work to encourage them to oper-
ate in the formal economy. An example is the food 
voucher system whereby employers can provide em-
ployees with food vouchers up to BGN 60 (€30) per 
month and this is nether included in the employees’ 
taxable income and is treated as a social expense and 
exempt from all taxes for employers (KC2 and Industry 
Watch, 2010). In 2013, the scheme was used by 4,000-
5,000 employers and covered 350,000 employees, or 
around 15-16 per cent of all employed (Dzhekova and 
Williams 2014). In a 2010 evaluation of the scheme by 
the consultancy companies Industry Watch and KC2 
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Ltd (2010), the finding was that employers use food 
vouchers to substitute for undeclared wage payments, 
thus leading to a reduction in the under-reporting of 
salaries.
The problem nevertheless, is that such incentives 
are in effect bribes offered precisely because they 
would not otherwise comply with the codified laws 
and regulations (i.e., state morality). Far more effective 
and cost-efficient than continuously offering bribes to 
conform, is to align informal institutions with formal 
institutions. Here, therefore, a second and rather differ-
ent policy approach is proposed that seeks to reduce 
the gap between civic morality and state morality. 
On the one hand, this requires policy measures to 
align civic morality with state morality, including edu-
cation and awareness raising campaigns regarding the 
importance and benefits of paying taxes. An example 
is the ‘Coming into the Light’ awareness raising cam-
paign of the Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association 
(Williams 2014a). Other possibilities are to use ‘your 
taxes are paying for this’ signs in hospitals, schools, on 
ambulances and other public construction projects. 
These education and awareness raising campaigns, 
moreover, and as Table 4 reveals, could be usefully tar-
geted at middle-aged people who view themselves as 
working class.
On the other hand, alterations in formal institutions 
are also needed. Drawing upon a large body of man-
agement research at the organisational level where 
a shift has taken place from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ HRM, and 
from bureaucratic to post-bureaucratic management 
(Legge 1995, Thompson and Alvesson 2005, Watson 
2003), a similar shift could be applied at the societal 
level when tackling participation in undeclared work. 
This would result in a policy shift away from the con-
ventional low commitment, low trust and adversarial 
‘hard’ policy approach seeking compliance through 
tight rules, close supervision and monitoring, pre-
scribed procedures and centralised structures. Instead, 
and mirroring how desirable behaviour change is 
elicited at the organisational level, a high trust, high 
commitment ‘soft’ policy approach would be pursued 
to nurture self-regulation through internalised com-
mitment. This necessitates a shift away from the cur-
rent ‘cops and robbers’ approach that views citizens 
as criminals and towards a customer service-oriented 
approach which views them as clients. To do this, im-
provements in the procedural and redistributive jus-
tice and fairness of formal institutions are necessary so 
that citizens believe that the authorities are treating 
them in a respectful, impartial and responsible man-
ner, believe that they pay their fair share and believe 
that they receive the goods and services they deserve 
(Molero and Pujol 2012, Murphy 2005). 
6. COnCluSIOnS
This article has propounded an explanation for the 
undeclared economy which asserts that the greater is 
the asymmetry between formal and informal institu-
tions (i.e., citizens’ civic morality and state morality), 
the greater is the likelihood of participation in the 
undeclared economy, and vice versa. The outcome 
is that tackling the undeclared economy requires a 
focus upon reducing this lack of alignment of formal 
and informal institutions. This is a different policy ap-
proach to that currently adopted. 
However, this paper has limitations. The major one 
is that even if the quantitative analysis reveals the im-
portance of aligning formal and informal institutions, 
it has not identified the reasons for the lack of adher-
ence to the formal rules by the Bulgarian population. 
Future qualitative research is therefore necessary to 
pinpoint these reasons. This will then enable target-
ed policy measures to be developed to attack these 
causes of the lack of alignment of formal and informal 
institutions.
In this article, in conclusion, a way of explaining and 
tackling the undeclared economy has been outlined. 
Whether this is also valid in South-Eastern Europe 
more generally, as well as other global regions, now 
requires evaluation. If this article therefore stimulates 
such evaluations, one of its major intentions will have 
been achieved. If it also encourages governments 
in South-East Europe to recognise this institutional 
asymmetry explanation for the undeclared economy 
and to begin exploring policies to reduce this asym-
metry, rather than persisting with the detection and 
punishment, then this article will have achieved its 
fuller intention. 
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